Stalingrad is a detailed and absorbing account of that campaign, but it is much more than just a dry tabulation of facts and figures, how many troops were involved, what battles were fought on what dates, how many sorties were flown, how many tons of supplies were dropped. Stalingrad analyzes the major personalities of both the Russian and German armies, but with special emphasis on the German. What were the German generals responsible for taking, and then holding, Stalingrad, thinking at the time? What were their personal strengths? Their weaknesses? How did those things contribute to the decisions they made, and how did that influence the final outcome?

You may find Stalingrad interesting reading, in part, because it dispels certain myths we Yankees have believed for so long about the German military in World War II. For instance? They didn't make mistakes. They planned everything in advance to the tiniest detail, and never deviated from that plan. They had an entirely mechanized army. They had soldiers that never faltered with iron-clad discipline. They had cold, calculating, high-command officers who never let personal feelings color their decisions.

Wrong.

Much, if not all, of the reason for the German defeat at Stalingrad came from a series of mistakes, in both the planning and execution of that part of the Russian campaign, worsened by the personal disputes between the generals at the front, and Goring and Hitler, safe in Germany. Because of Hitler's interference, the offensive to take Stalingrad started too late in the year, so by the time the city was in German control, winter was starting, and the German Sixth Army was not prepared. Temperatures dropped so low it made it difficult for soldiers to work or fight; planes and tanks could not be started, weapons would not fire. The Russians, however, were used to this, and could readily field troops and equipment, even in the coldest weather.

The German generals knew they could not hold Stalingrad without reinforcements, both in men and supplies. They wanted to withdraw, in part so the Russian armies could not surround them. Hitler refused; it was part of his mania of "not one step back", "stand and hold", and "fight to the last bullet". Failing permission for a withdrawal, the German generals tried to get Hitler to approve an effort for another German force to fight its way to Stalingrad, link with the Sixth Army, and withdraw. While this plan was eventually approved, it was too late; the Russians had brought in enough troops to block that attempt, and it never reached Stalingrad.

What to do? Once the Sixth Army was surrounded in Stalingrad, there was also the problem of how to supply the troops there. Hitler had become convinced that it could be done by air; Goring had boasted that his airforce could drop 300 tons of supplies a day to the encircled army. Even if that were true, 300 tons a day was not even the minimum needed to keep the army going; it was closer to 500 tons a day. Everything had to be brought in; food, fuel, medical supplies, clothing, etc. And the Luftwaffe did not have the planes for the job. Besides, there weren't enough airfields in or near the city, there weren't enough German fighter planes to protect the supply planes on the way in or out, and there were not enough clear flying days for supply delivery. Some supplies were brought in by air, but on average, less than a third of the "minimum" of 300 tons per day, and the Luftwaffe lost many planes and experienced pilots.

It didn't take long for things to go from bad to worse for the Sixth Army. Food rations were cut repeatedly, to where soldiers usually only got a slice or two of bread, and maybe a bit of meat, per day. There was not enough anesthesia for operations in field hospitals, or medical supplies of any sort for the more serious battlefield injuries. Severely injured soldiers were left to die in the snow by runways, while the walking wounded boarded planes that would take them out of the city to safety (walking wounded could stand in the transport planes flying out of the city, while the badly wounded had to lie on stretchers; many more soldiers could be evacuated per plane standing than lying). Horses used to pull artillery pieces and wagons were killed and eaten. Troops began to desert in increasing numbers.

Logically, there were two options. Surrender, and save your men's lives, and avoid more suffering. Or, mass your remaining forces, and break out of the city through the surrounding Russians, hoping to reach the nearest part of the rest of the German army with some survivors. Hitler refused both options to the commanders of the forces in Stalingrad, generals Paulus and Schmidt. Despite that, other German generals tried to convince them to disobey Hitler, and break out of the city. That too, was a failure.

Could it have been worse? The Russians made repeated offers to the Germans for their surrender, ending with a delegation of Russian officers, who tried to present surrender terms in writing to the German commanders. They were curtly turned away. It was not long after that the battle worthiness of the German troops in Stalingrad dropped so low, that ammunition and fuel became so scarce, that even had a breakout been sanctioned, the troops no longer had the strength to fight or march for days, supplies for weapons for extended fighting, or gasoline and diesel for the trucks and tanks to move far from the city.

The last battle in the city rubble was joined, and despite desperate efforts, the Russians took the city, and the remaining Germans surrendered. Still, their defeat was not their final humiliation. Ordinary soldiers, and low-ranking officers, were sent to forced labor camps; many of them died. The highest-ranking officers, like Paulus, were used for propaganda; they were directed to read scripts critical of Hitler and Germany's war in Russia. Even after the war, when Paulus was released and returned to Germany, he spent the rest of his life trying to "explain" his actions, and his loss, at Stalingrad.

Despite the claim that history is written by the victor, there is little here that any side would likely disagree with. Stalingrad was a great effort, planned and executed badly, where too much was asked of too few, and the outcome was inevitable.

Recommended:
Yes